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We study the public goods game in the noisy case by considering the players with inhomogeneous activity
teaching on a square lattice. It is shown that the introduction of the inhomogeneous activity of teaching of the
players can remarkably promote cooperation. By investigating the effects of noise on cooperative behavior in
detail, we find that the variation of cooperator density ρC with the noise parameter κ displays several different
behaviors: ρC monotonically increases (decreases) with κ; ρC firstly increases (decreases) with κ and then
it decreases (increases) monotonically after reaching its maximum (minimum) value, which depends on the
amount of the multiplication factor r, on whether the system is homogeneous or inhomogeneous, and on whether
the adopted updating is synchronous or asynchronous. These results imply that the noise plays an important and
nontrivial role in the evolution of cooperation.
PACS numbers: 89.65.-s, 02.50.Le, 07.05.Tp, 87.23.Kg
I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperation plays an important role in the real world, rang-
ing from biological systems to economic and as well as so-
cial systems [1]. Scientists from different fields of natural
and social sciences often resort to evolutionary game theory
[2, 3] as a common mathematical framework and the pris-
oner’s dilemma game (PDG) as a metaphor for studying co-
operation between selfish and unrelated individuals [3]. The
PDG, which captures typical pairwise interactions in many
cases, has become the leading paradigm to explain coopera-
tive behavior[4, 5]. As an alternative, the public goods game
(PGG), which can be regarded as a PDG with more than two
participators, attracts also much attention to study the emer-
gence of cooperative behavior [6]. In a typical PGG played
by N agents [7], each of them must decide independently and
simultaneously whether or not to invest to a common pool.
The collected investment will be multiplied by a factor r, and
then is redistributed uniformly among all players irrespective
of their actual contributions. It was shown that for the values
of 1 < r < N , the free riders or defectors (i.e., those who do
not invest) will dominate the whole population [8, 9].
To provide an escape hatch out of economic stalemate,
Hauert et al. have introduced the voluntary participation in
such public goods and found that it results in a substantial and
persistent willingness to cooperate [10]. Szabo´ et al. have
studied the voluntary participation in PGG on square lattice
[7] and found that the introduction of loners leads to a cyclic
dominance of the strategies and promotes substantial levels of
cooperation. a remarkable increase of cooperation is also ob-
served for those systems where the inhomogeneous imitation
activity is introduced artificially to characterize the asymmet-
ric and different influence of players to each other [11]. In
Ref. [12], Wu et al. have studied the PDG with the dynamic
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preferential rule and found that cooperation is substantially
enhanced due to this simple selection mechanism. The effect
of payoffs and noise on the maintenance of cooperative behav-
ior has been studied in PDG where two types of players (A and
B) with different activity of teaching are introduced on regular
connectivity structures [13]. It was found that the introduction
of the inhomogeneous activity of teaching the players can re-
markably promote cooperation [13].
In the present, we study the effects of noise on the cooper-
ative behavior by considering the players with the inhomoge-
neous activity of teaching in PGG on the square lattice. Our
goals are to investigate (i) whether the inhomogeneous activ-
ity of teaching of the players can promote cooperation in PGG,
and (ii) how the noise level affects the cooperative behavior
in the PGG. Our observations suggest that, the cooperative be-
havior is remarkably enhanced due to the introduction of the
inhomogeneous activity of teaching. And we also find that the
cooperator density ρC changing with the noise level exhibits
several different behaviors, which depends on the values of
the multiplication factor r, on whether the system is homo-
geneous or inhomogeneous, and also on whether the adopted
updating is synchronous or asynchronous.
II. THE MODEL AND SIMULATIONS
Motivated by previous research work [12, 13], we consider
in our model two types of players (A and B) who are dis-
tributed randomly on the sites of a square lattice before the
start of the simulation. The fraction of players A and B are
denoted by ν and (1− ν), respectively. We consider the com-
pulsory version of a spatial PGG [7], i.e., both types of players
are only cooperators (C) or defectors (D). Each player inter-
acts only with its four nearest neighbors (von Neumann neigh-
borhood). Thus the size of interaction is g = 5. The payoff of
each player depends on the number of cooperators nc in the
neighborhood, i.e., the player x’s payoff is
px =
rnc
g
− 1, if sx = C,
2px =
rnc
g
− 0, if sx = D, (1)
where sx denotes the strategy of the player x, and r represents
the multiplication factor on the public good. The cooperative
investments are normalized to unity and r > 1 must hold such
that groups of cooperators are better off than groups of defec-
tors.
After each generation, the players try to maximize their in-
dividual payoff by imitating (learning) one of the more suc-
cessful neighboring strategies. Following previous studies
[5, 7, 12, 13, 14], player x will adopt the randomly chosen
neighbor y’s strategy sy with a probability depending on the
payoff difference (px − py) as
W (sx → sy) = ωxy
1
1 + exp[(px − py)/κ]
, (2)
where κ denotes the amplitude of noise. The pre-factor ωxy is
given as
ωxy = 1, if ny = A,
ωxy = ω, if ny = B, (3)
where the value of ω (0 < ω < 1) characterizes the strength of
reduced teaching activity if the site y is occupied by a player
of type B [13].
Simulations were carried out for a population of N =
100×100 individuals. We study the key quantity of cooperator
density ρC in the steady state. Initially, the two strategies of
C and D are randomly distributed among the individuals with
equal probability 1/2. The above model was simulated with
both synchronous and asynchronous updating. Eventually, the
system reaches a dynamic equilibrium state. The simulation
results were obtained by averaging over the last 104 Monte
Carlo (MC) time steps of the total 105. Each data point results
from an average over 20 realizations.
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FIG. 1: (Color online) The cooperator density ρC vs the multiplica-
tion factor r when ν = 1 by using the synchronous and asynchronous
updating. The noise parameter is κ = 0.1.
III. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
To facilitate comparison, we first consider the homoge-
neous system (ν = 1), i.e. the system for two types of players
with the same teaching activity. Fig. 1 shows that the coop-
erator density ρC varies as the multiplication factor r when
ν = 1 by using synchronous and asynchronous updating. We
can find from this figure that, below some threshold values of
the multiplication factor (r < rs for synchronous updating
and r < ras for asynchronous updating), the fraction of co-
operators ρC vanishes and the defectors reign; while for the
values of multiplication factor r > rs and r > ras, the coop-
erator density ρC increases with r. For large r, ρC can reach
its maximum value 1, i.e., the system reaches the absorbing
state of all cooperators, because large values of r are in favor
of cooperators in the context of the PGG [8]. We compare
the simulation results for synchronous and asynchronous up-
dating and find that, when r is smaller than a certain value
rc, ρC is larger for asynchronous updating than that for syn-
chronous updating, but the reverse is true for r > rc. Here
we want to remark that in the process of our simulation, for
synchronous updating, in each time step, all sites are updated
simultaneously through competition with a randomly chosen
neighbor. For asynchronous updating, however, in each time
step, the individuals update their strategies one by one in a
random sequence. It is known that in the context of the PGG,
small values of r favor defectors and large r benefits cooper-
ators [8, 9]. Comparing the average frequency of cooperators
under the same values of r, we find that for small (large) r,
defectors (cooperators) live better for synchronous updating
than that for asynchronous updating.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
 
 
C
FIG. 2: (Color online) The simulation results of cooperator density
ρC as a function of ν for different values of ω when r = 4.8 and
κ = 0.1 by using synchronous (solid symbols) and asynchronous
(hollow symbols) updating on the square lattice. The values of ω
from top to bottom are respectively 0.01, 0.1, 0.2, and 1.0.
In Fig. 2, we show the variation of cooperator density ρC
with the fraction ν of individuals A for several different val-
ues of ω when r = 4.8 and κ = 0.1 by using synchronous
3(solid symbols) and asynchronous updating (hollow symbols).
In our model, if ω = 1 the system is equivalent to a homo-
geneous system (discussed in Fig. 1). For ω < 1, i.e., the
inhomogeneous system, the cooperator density ρC increases
monotonously until reaching the maximum value at ν ≃ 0.4
(ν ≃ 0.33) for synchronous (asynchronous) updating, and
then it decreases with ν. And we also find that for the same
value of ν, the smaller the ω is, the larger the ρC will be. This
phenomenon is similar to the results obtained in Ref. [13].
We argue that it is a general phenomenon that the introduction
of reducing activity of teaching can remarkably enhance the
cooperative behavior in the context of whether PDG or PGG
[15]. From Fig. 2, we can also see that the qualitative results of
the cooperative behavior are unchanged for both synchronous
and asynchronous updating. Quantitatively, for the same value
of ν, the cooperator density ρC is larger for synchronous up-
dating than that for asynchronous updating when ω < 1, but
the reverse is true in the case of ω = 1. It indicates that, the
enhanced level of cooperation due to the introduction of re-
ducing activity of teaching depends on the detailed updating
(synchronous or asynchronous).
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FIG. 3: (Color online) The cooperator density ρC vs the multipli-
cation factor r in homogeneous (a),(b) and inhomogeneous (c),(d)
systems by using the synchronous (a),(c) and asynchronous (b),(d)
updating for three noise parameters: κ = 0.01, 0.1, 1.0.
In our simulations, we find that the level of noise, i.e., the
magnitude of κ, has a nontrivial effect on the evolution of co-
operation. We show in Fig. 3 the cooperator density ρC vary-
ing with the multiplication factor r in homogeneous [Figs.
3(a) and (b)] and inhomogeneous [Figs. 3(c) and (d)] sys-
tems for several different values of κ by using the synchronous
[Figs. 3(a) and (c)] and asynchronous [Figs. 3(b) and (d)] up-
dating. In the stationary state ρC monotonously increases if r
is increased for the same noise parameter. For the three noise
parameter κ = 0.01, 0.1, 1.0, in homogeneous systems [Fig.
3(a) and (b)], when r = 4.8, ρC firstly increases and then de-
creases with κ, while for r = 5.1, ρC monotonously decreases
with κ; for larger values of r = 6.0, the cooperator density
displays different behaviors with κ: ρC monotonously de-
creases with κ for synchronous updating in Fig. 3(a); and ρC
firstly decreases and then increases with κ for asynchronous
updating in Fig. 3(b). In inhomogeneous systems (Fig. 3(c)
and (d)), when r = 4.8, ρC monotonously increases with κ;
while for r = 5.05, ρC firstly decreases and then increases
with κ; for smaller values of r = 4.26, the cooperator density
displays different behaviors with κ: ρC firstly increases and
then decreases with κ for synchronous updating in Fig. 3(c);
and ρC monotonously increases with κ for asynchronous up-
dating in Fig. 3(d). To investigate this in detail, we plot ρC
vs κ for different values of r by using synchronous and asyn-
chronous updating in homogeneous and inhomogeneous sys-
tems respectively (see Fig. 4).
Before making further discussions about our MC data, we
want to give a brief description of the mean field result for the
PGG. In a well mixed population (i.e., in the mean field case)
with initial number of cooperator NρC , each cooperator and
defector will get, respectively, rρC − 1 and rρC payoff. If a
defector (cooperator) changes its strategy to be a cooperator
(defector), then its payoff variation is r/N −1 (and 1− r/N ).
For any values of r larger than N , one can easily see that the
transformation of defection to cooperation is preferred by the
players, and the whole population will be dominated by coop-
erators. In the reverse, for 1 < r < N , defectors dominate the
population [5, 8, 9]. Looking back on Fig. 3, it is clear that in
the low noise limit κ = 0.01, the MC data are in accordance
with the results predicted by mean field theory [5, 8, 9], i.e.,
ρC = 0 if r < 5.0 and ρC = 1 if r > 5.0 (N = g = 5 in the
present case).
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FIG. 4: (Color online) The cooperator density ρC vs the noise param-
eter κ in homogeneous (a),(b) and inhomogeneous (c),(d) systems by
using the synchronous (a),(c) and asynchronous (b),(d) updating for
different values of r: the detailed values are shown in the plots.
Figure 4 shows that the fraction of cooperators ρC varies
with the noise parameter κ for different values of r in the
two systems [the homogeneous in Figs. 4(a) and 4(b), the
4inhomogeneous in Figs. 4(c) and 4(d)] by using two updat-
ing rules (the synchronous updating in Fig. 4 (a) and (c), the
asynchronous updating in Fig. 4 (b) and (d)). Let us first see
the case in homogeneous systems. In Figs. 4 (a) and 4(b),
when r = 4.8, the cooperator density ρC firstly increases
monotonously until reaching the maximum value, and then
decreases monotonously with κ, which indicates that the co-
operative behavior can be remarkably enhanced at the optimal
level of noise both for synchronous and asynchronous updat-
ing in homogeneous systems. For larger values of r, the con-
centration of cooperators ρC changing with κ displays dif-
ferent behaviors: It decreases monotonously with κ for syn-
chronous updating [see the curves for r = 5.1, 5.5, 6.0 in
Fig. 4 (a)]; while for asynchronous updating, when increas-
ing the noise level, one can observe the valleys in the concen-
tration of cooperators [see the curves for r = 5.1, 5.5, 6.0 in
Fig. 4 (b)]. That is, a large level of noise evidently inhibits
the persistence of cooperation for synchronous updating; but
for asynchronous updating, the cooperative behavior can be
inhibited mostly at certain value of κ, which indicates that
the cooperative behavior depends remarkably on the updating
rule. In inhomogeneous systems, for synchronous updating
[Fig. 4(c)], the cooperator density ρC varying with κ displays
three different behaviors: ρC firstly increases with κ and then
decreases monotonously after reaching its maximum value for
small value of r = 4.26; ρC increases monotonously with
κ for moderate value of r = 4.8; ρC firstly decreases with
κ and then increases monotonously after reaching its mini-
mum value for large value of r = 5.05. This indicates that
the changing behavior of ρC with κ are related closely to the
multiplication factor r. But for asynchronous updating [Fig.
4(d)], when r = 4.26, ρC increases monotonously with κ,
which is different from the case for synchronous updating.
Once again, this indicates definitely that the cooperative be-
havior has strong dependence on the updating rule.
In addition, for the synchronous updating and the same
value of r, we can observe a peak in the concentration of
cooperators when increasing the noise level in homogeneous
system [see the curve for r = 4.8 in Fig. 4(a)], but the coop-
erator density ρC increases monotonously with the parameter
κ in inhomogeneous systems [see the curve for r = 4.8 in
Fig. 4(c)]. It indicates that the evolution of cooperation also
depends on whether the system is homogeneous or inhomoge-
neous. From the above behaviors, we can conclude that the ef-
fects of noise on the cooperative behavior remarkably depend
on the values of r, on whether the system is homogeneous or
inhomogeneous, and on whether the updating is synchronous
or asynchronous.
IV. CONCLUSION
In summary, we have studied the effects of noise on cooper-
ation in spatial public goods games by considering two types
of players with different activity of teaching. It was shown
that the introduction of the inhomogeneous activity of teach-
ing the players can remarkably enhance the persistence of co-
operation. The introduction of the inhomogeneous activity of
teaching can partially resolve the dilemma of cooperation and
may shed new light on the evolution of cooperation in the so-
ciety. By investigating the effects of noise on the coopera-
tive behavior in detail, we found that the cooperator density
ρC varying with the noise level κ displays several different
behaviors, which remarkably depends on the values of r, on
whether the system is homogeneous or inhomogeneous, and
on whether the updating is synchronous or asynchronous. In-
terestingly, when increasing the level of noise, we observed
both peaks and valleys in the concentration of cooperators for
the middle level of noise. Thus the effect of noise is a corre-
lated factor in game dynamics, which plays an important role
in the evolution of cooperation.
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